US x Iran ceasefire continues through October 31?

Likely yes — the reported two-week ceasefire, conflicting claims of renewed strikes, and prior U.S. statements against attacking before the midterms support continuation under the narrowly defined resolution rules. The main risk is that the ceasefire collapses and the U.S. conducts a qualifying air or surface-to-surface strike directly impacting Iranian territory before October 31.

Uncertain — reporting is contradictory, with some claims of a ceasefire holding and others claiming strikes resumed, but no confirmed qualifying strike directly on Iranian territory is verified as of 2026-10-15; Trump's stated reluctance to strike before midterms (11/3) supports restraint through 10/31, but active tensions and conflicting reports on strikes make this a close call. Confirmation of an actual US air/missile strike hitting Iranian soil before 10/31 would flip this to No.

Likely yes — while reports indicate high tension, statements suggest a two-week ceasefire took effect around mid-October, and political incentives ahead of the November U.S. midterms discourage direct strikes on Iranian soil. The strict resolution criteria require a direct impact on Iran's terrestrial territory by U.S. air or missile strikes, excluding maritime or intercepted engagements. However, the situation remains highly volatile, and any sudden escalation or proxy provocation could trigger immediate U.S. retaliatory strikes before October 31.

Likely yes — Trump publicly pledged no attack before the Nov 3 midterms and a two-week ceasefire was reported around Oct 14, with no confirmed qualifying air or missile strike on Iranian territory by Oct 15. Conflicting same-day claims of resumed nightly strikes exist but are unconfirmed and would still have to continue or restart after mid-October. The main way this fails is if those unconfirmed strikes are real or a new round begins before Oct 31 despite the midterm pledge.

Probably not — the reporting is contradictory, with one source claiming a seventh consecutive night of U.S. strikes on Iran and a ceasefire already broken, while others describe a fragile two-week truce. Given the active military posture and prior strike preparations, the risk of a qualifying U.S. air or missile strike directly impacting Iranian territory before October 31 is substantial. The main thing that could prove this wrong is if the ceasefire actually holds and the conflicting strike reports are inaccurate or refer to non-qualifying actions.

Likely yes — Trump has strong political incentive to avoid strikes before the November 3 midterms, and a two-week ceasefire was reportedly agreed around October 14, suggesting both sides want a pause. However, conflicting reports of continued strikes on October 14 and the inherent volatility of the situation create meaningful risk of a qualifying strike before October 31, especially if the ceasefire expires around October 28 without renewal.

Probably yes — recent reports indicate a two-week ceasefire was agreed upon around 2026-10-14, and no confirmed qualifying U.S. strikes on Iran have occurred since. The main risk is conflicting reports of a breakdown and unconfirmed strikes, which could invalidate the ceasefire.

Likely yes — The most consistent reporting confirms a new U.S.-Iran ceasefire as of 2026-10-14, with a formal two-week period that extends beyond the market's 10/31 deadline. Despite this, the situation is highly unstable, and the primary things that could prove me wrong are an immediate breakdown of the fragile ceasefire or the U.S. verifying the claim of a seventh night of strikes. The market is pricing a tense, sticky peace rather than an active war.

Likely yes but far from certain — a two-week ceasefire reportedly agreed on 2026-10-14 would nominally cover through 2026-10-31, and Trump has said the U.S. will not attack Iran before the 2026-11-03 midterms. However, one 2026-10-14 report claims the ceasefire already collapsed with a seventh consecutive night of U.S. strikes on Iran, which if true would resolve No immediately. The main risk is that unconfirmed strike reporting proves accurate or the ceasefire breaks down before month-end.

Probably not — reports indicate the U.S. has already conducted seven consecutive nights of strikes on Iran, and if any of those involved air strikes or cruise/ballistic missiles impacting Iranian territory, the market would resolve No. However, conflicting reporting about a ceasefire and the exclusion of naval gunfire, artillery, and minor strikes leave some uncertainty. The main risk to this view is that the reported strikes were naval gunfire or intercepted munitions, which wouldn't qualify, or that the ceasefire holds and no qualifying action occurs by October 31.