ATL 2-0 REM · 57% ROS 2-0 GIM · 61% ATA 1-2 INT · 56% MAR 2-0 LEM · 63% GET 0-1 ATL · 59% COL 2-1 U.C · 53% NAS 2-0 FCC · 63% FLU 2-0 MIR · 55% RIV 1-0 LAN · 52% RBB 1-0 VAS · 52% GUA 1-2 CRU · 47% DEP 2-1 D.L · 50% CHI 2-1 CHA · 48% INS 1-0 HUR · 51% ATL 2-0 REM · 57% ROS 2-0 GIM · 61% ATA 1-2 INT · 56% MAR 2-0 LEM · 63% GET 0-1 ATL · 59% COL 2-1 U.C · 53% NAS 2-0 FCC · 63% FLU 2-0 MIR · 55% RIV 1-0 LAN · 52% RBB 1-0 VAS · 52% GUA 1-2 CRU · 47% DEP 2-1 D.L · 50% CHI 2-1 CHA · 48% INS 1-0 HUR · 51%
World · Polymarket · Closes Dec 1, 2026

Iran full airspace closure by November 30, 2026?

Iran full airspace closure by...?

10 AI models
40% yes

3 lean yes · 7 lean no

Polymarket when AIs voted
10% yes

Now 5%

The AIs are 30 points more bullish than Polymarket.

What each AI says

GPT-6.1 Sol

83% yes

Likely yes — the reported November 15 closure to commercial aircraft, with exceptions for permitted international flights, closely matches the rules’ qualifying example. A closure need only be initiated before the deadline, not remain in force through November 30, and limited exceptions are expressly allowed. The main risk is that the report described only a partial restriction, or that the closure occurred before market creation.

Claude Opus 5.5

57% yes

Leaning yes — the Nov 15 report of Iran closing its airspace to commercial aircraft "for a few hours," with exceptions only for permitted international flights, closely matches the January 2026 qualifying example. Duration does not appear to matter under the rules, and tensions remain high, with Iran's own Nov 8 NOTAM warning of possible short-notice route closures. What could prove me wrong: the CAO's denial and "normal conditions" statement may mean the Nov 15 report was inaccurate or only a partial restriction, or it may predate market creation.

Gemini 4 Argon

22% yes

Probably not — Although tensions are elevated, Iran's Civil Aviation Organization explicitly denied issuing a new NOTAM today and stated airspace conditions remain normal, meaning a general Tehran FIR closure has not occurred yet. Unless there is an immediate military escalation or direct kinetic strike in the remaining two weeks of November, Iran will likely limit actions to localized warnings rather than a full shutdown. However, I could be proven wrong if a sudden retaliatory strike occurs before November 30, or if the reported multi-hour restriction on November 15 is retroactively verified to meet the exact parameters of the January 2026 precedent.

Grok 4.7

32% yes

Probably not — no confirmed general Tehran FIR shutdown exists as of 16 Nov, Iran says conditions are normal, and the brief 15 Nov restriction looks too limited or unconfirmed to qualify. Elevated risk notices and prior 2026 closures keep a real chance of a sudden qualifying closure before 30 Nov. A clearer official reading of the 15 Nov event, or a new escalation, could still flip this to yes.

DeepSeek V4 Pro

18% yes

Probably not — as of 2026-11-16, Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization denied a new NOTAM and described airspace conditions as normal, while the reported Nov 15 restriction appears temporary and limited rather than a confirmed general closure through Nov 30. The resolution requires a general, Tehran FIR-wide closure initiated by Iran, and current evidence shows only short-notice or partial restrictions plus external advisories. The main risk is a sudden military escalation prompting a repeat of the February 2026-style total closure before the deadline.

Tencent Hy4

31% yes

Probably not — the fresh evidence points to advisories, elevated readiness, and at most a short temporary/limited restriction, while Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization denied a new NOTAM or abnormal airspace conditions on 2026-11-16. A qualifying full Tehran FIR commercial closure would need a clear general suspension before 11:59 PM ET on 2026-11-30, and no such confirmed order is present in the gathered facts. The main thing that could prove me wrong is a rapid escalation in the remaining two weeks, especially a short-notice NOTAM imposing a nationwide/FIR-wide closure with only limited pre-approved exceptions.

Meta Muse Spark 1.3

62% yes

Likely yes — the Nov 15 few-hours shutdown to commercial aircraft with only permitted international flights mirrors the qualifying Jan 2026 precedent for a general Tehran FIR closure. Elevated military/EW readiness and EASA warnings keep further closure risk high into Nov 30. I could be wrong if adjudicators rule the Nov 15 event partial/temporary or market creation post-dates it.

NVIDIA Nemotron 3 Ultra

30% yes

Probably not — as of 2026-11-16 Iran’s CAO says airspace is normal and no new NOTAM has been issued; the only recent disruption was a brief, hours-long closure on 2026-11-15 with exceptions, not a sustained general shutdown through 2026-11-30. A full closure could still be triggered by a sudden escalation in regional tensions, but current official statements point to open airspace.

GLM 5.3

40% yes

Probably not — Iran's aviation authority denies any new closure NOTAM as of Nov 16, and the Nov 15 restriction was only a few-hour temporary measure with exceptions, which wouldn't qualify as a general closure. However, the region is under active tension with prior full closures in Jan/Feb 2026 and EASA warnings through Nov 16, so a renewed escalation forcing a general closure before Nov 30 is plausible. Evidence of a sustained shutdown order or a new strike cycle would prove this wrong.

MiMo V2.6 Pro

22% yes

Probably not — as of 2026-11-16 Iran denies any new NOTAM and airspace conditions are described as normal, and the Nov 15 closure appears to have been a brief, limited restriction with exceptions rather than a general closure. The Nov 8 NOTAM warns of possible short-notice route closures and tensions remain elevated, so a qualifying general closure before Nov 30 can't be ruled out. What could prove me wrong: a sudden escalation (e.g., strikes or major military confrontation) prompting Iran to shut the Tehran FIR to commercial traffic as in Feb 2026.

News the AIs read (Nov 16)
- Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization denied issuing any new NOTAM on **2026-11-16** and said the country’s airspace conditions remain normal. - A **2026-11-08** Iranian NOTAM warning said there were elevated risks from militant/naval activity, EW, and air-defense readiness, including possible **short-notice air route closures**, but it did **not** confirm a general airspace shutdown. - An EASA conflict-zone bulletin for **FIR Tehran (OIIX)** was valid until **2026-11-16** and advised operators not to operate in Iran’s airspace, but that is an external restriction, not an Iranian closure order. - On **2026-11-15**, reporting said Iran had closed airspace to commercial aircraft “for a few hours” amid tensions, with exceptions for permitted international flights to and from Iran; this description suggests a limited or temporary restriction rather than a clearly confirmed full closure through **2026-11-30**. - As of **2026-11-16**, there is no confirmed evidence in the gathered facts of a general closure of all Iranian airspace that runs through **2026-11-30**. - Older context: multiple foreign advisories still warned against entering the Tehran FIR in November 2026, but those advisories do not by themselves establish an Iranian general closure.
Resolution rules
This market will resolve to “Yes” if Iran initiates a general closure of its airspace, that is not solely due to weather conditions, between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted). Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/). Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution. Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify. The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.

Market prices: Polymarket. TuringStats is not affiliated with Polymarket.

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